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ABSTRACT 
 
Amelia Louise Goranson: Dying is Unexpectedly Positive  
(Under the direction of Kurt Gray) 
 
In people’s imagination, dying seems dreadful; however, these perceptions may not 
reflect reality. In two studies, we compared the affective experience of people facing imminent 
death with that of people imagining imminent death. Study 1 revealed that blog posts of near-
death patients with cancer and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis were more positive and less negative 
than the simulated blog posts of nonpatients—and also that the patients’ blog posts became more 
positive as death neared. Study 2 revealed that the last words of death-row inmates were more 
positive and less negative than the simulated last words of noninmates—and also that these last 
words were less negative than poetry written by death-row inmates. Together, these results 
suggest that the experience of dying—even because of terminal illness or execution—may be 
more pleasant than one imagines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Both death and its inevitability are central to the human condition, inspiring countless 
poems, books, and plays— as well as substantial psychological research. Much of this research 
has focused on the general idea of one’s own death (Kashdan et al., 2014; Lambert et al., 2014) 
or reactions to other people’s deaths (Kastenbaum, 2000; Nelson & Nelson, 1975), rather than 
the actual experience of dying. What is it like to have only days—or even minutes—left to live? 
We investigated the emotional lives of individuals about to die from terminal illness or execution 
and assessed whether their experience differs from how people imagine dying.  
Becker (1997) suggested that the mere thought of eventual death is so terrifying that 
ideologies, such as religion, can automatically suppress or sublimate these thoughts—an idea 
borne out by early research (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). 
These systems of belief can, at times, be effective in allaying explicit chronic death anxiety 
(Halberstadt & Jong, 2014) and can dampen affective responses to the threat of distant death 
(DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Kashdan et al., 2014). However, evidence for conscious death 
anxiety is mixed; more recent research suggests that death anxiety, if present, likely occurs for 
relatively distal threats (e.g., situations that might lead to death) or at a subconscious level (Jong 
& Halberstadt, 2016). At the same time, cultural narratives suggest that people believe that dying 
will be dreadful (Gawande, 2014; Reiss, 1991), and some evidence shows that being forced to 
confront imminent death can produce negative affect in the moment (Lambert et al., 2014). 
 These negative beliefs about dying may be overinflated. Research on affective 
forecasting suggests that people overestimate the affective impact of negative events because of 
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both focalism—thinking of the negative events in isolation (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, 
& Axsom, 2000)—and immune neglect—discounting their ability to positively reinterpret 
negative events (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). When imagining death, 
for example, people may envision feelings of loneliness and meaninglessness, rather than 
feelings of social connection and meaning. This research suggests that people forecasting 
feelings about death might overlook people’s tendency to focus on positive information (Addis, 
Leclerc, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2010; Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014) and use more positive-
affect words (Pennebaker & Stone, 2003) as they age or approach the end of life events, such as 
college years (Reed & Carstensen, 2012). Grounding our predictions in these two streams of 
research, we therefore hypothesized that people who are close to death will view it more 
positively and less negatively than those who are imagining their death from a greater distance. 
Evidence that dying is more pleasant than expected may suggest a reassessment of one of 
humanity’s great fears.  
Given that language offers insight into individuals’ emotional lives (Lindquist, Barrett, 
Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006), we tested our account by examining language from individuals 
who were near death—terminally ill patients and death-row inmates—and comparing it with 
language from individuals who were only imagining death. We assessed the positivity and 
negativity of these language samples using both the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program 
(LIWC; see Kahn, Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker 
& King, 1999) and independent coders. One analysis of death-row utterances (Hirschmüller & 
Egloff, 2016) revealed substantial positivity among inmates just prior to execution, which is 
consistent with our predictions. We built on this research in three ways. First, we included 
conditions in which people forecast the emotional experience of death, which allowed us to 
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compare their predictions with reality. Second, we included a sample of death-row inmates’ 
poetry to compare the emotional experience of simply being on death row (which can last for 
years) with that of facing imminent execution. Third, we included a unique sample of people 
approaching death:  terminally ill patients who maintained blogs over the course of their illness. 
This allowed us to compare their near-death emotional experience with both their own earlier 
emotional experience and the emotional experience of nonpatients writing blog posts while 
imagining imminent death. 
 In sum, we compared blogs of terminally ill patients (Study 1) and the last words of 
death-row inmates (Study 2) with forecasts of everyday people imagining themselves facing 
death. We also examined affect over time in the blogs of terminally ill patients (Study 1) and 
compared death-row last words with death-row poetry (Study 2). 
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EXPERIMENT 1: BLOGS OF TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 
In our first study, to compare forecasts with experiences of death, we contrasted the 
affective tone of blog posts of terminally ill patients with that of simulated posts of nonpatient 
forecasters. To examine these writings, we used both LIWC and affect ratings by independent 
coders, which were important to include because LIWC is less focused on context (e.g., it codes 
“I am not happy” and “I am happy” as containing equal numbers of positive affect words). 
Exploratory analyses also examined how the affective character of the terminally ill patients’ 
language changed as they approached death. We hypothesized that affective forecasts about 
death would be inaccurate, and specifically that they would be less positive and more negative 
than the blog posts of the patients. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Patients’ blogs. The blogs about terminal cancer and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) 
were chosen using stringent selection criteria prior to any analysis. First, we narrowed the focus 
to cancer and ALS, because individuals terminally ill with these diseases retain mental 
functioning relatively far into the course of their illness (which is not the case for illnesses such 
as Alzheimer’s disease or multiple sclerosis). To find the blogs, we used Google to search for 
“cancer blog” and “ALS blog.” We took the first 100 hits for each illness and then pared them 
down using the following three requirements. The first requirement was that the individual who 
was actually diagnosed with the illness—not a family member, friend, or spouse—was the author 
of the blog. The second requirement was that the individual died during the process of writing 
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the blog—in other words, any blogs that were “in progress” were excluded from all analyses. We 
confirmed that each selected writer did, indeed, pass away by locating either his or her obituary 
or a blog post in which a family member or friend reported the death (and date) to the blog’s 
followers. The third requirement was that the blog had at least 10 posts over a span of at least 3 
months, which would provide sufficient time and data density for longitudinal analysis. Twenty 
cancer blogs and five ALS blogs met these criteria and yielded a total of 2,616 blog posts. Fifty-
two percent of the bloggers were female, and 80% were American. The median number of posts 
per blog was 73 (range: 17–477), and the median number of weeks spanned before death was 
57 (range: 12–171).  
Each blog post was time-coded for the week that it was written; “0” indicated the week 
during which the death occurred, and negative numbers indicated the number of weeks prior to 
death (e.g., a post written 32 weeks before death was coded −32). For purposes of comparing 
nonpatients’ forecasts about the death experience with patients’ blogs, we selected the last 3 
months (12 weeks) of blog posts as representing the “near death” period (n = 597 posts). To 
ensure that 12 weeks was not an unrepresentative cutoff value, we performed robustness checks 
by comparing mean positive and negative affect in Week −12 with mean positive and negative 
affect for each other week from Week −8 through Week −16. As the 95% confidence intervals 
for Week −12 overlapped with those from the comparison weeks, we concluded that positive and 
negative affect in Week −12 were not unrepresentative of these data. This reassured us that 
results of comparing patients’ blogs posts with nonpatients’ forecasts would be similar across 
different near death cutoffs. 
Nonpatients’ forecasts. To obtain forecasts of nonpatients, we recruited 50 participants 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Internet samples are often used in psychological 
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research (Skitka & Sargis, 2006), and MTurk samples provide reliability (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011) and quality (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014) equal to that of lab samples. Of 
the 50 participants recruited, 45 (23 female, 22 male; mean age = 38.8 years) successfully met 
length requirements (see the next paragraph) and followed directions. Given that we were unable 
to obtain complete demographic information from the bloggers, it was not possible to match the 
bloggers and nonpatient forecasters on demographic factors.  
The nonpatient forecasters were asked to imagine that they had been diagnosed with 
terminal cancer and had created a blog in which they wrote about their experience with this 
illness. They were asked to “write a post for your blog, keeping in mind that you only have a few 
months left to live.” The instructions specified that the nonpatients should write at least 200 
characters (approximately 40 words). Most wrote substantially more; the mean word count was 
165.73 (range: 82−373). Many of these nonpatient forecasters reported that they found writing 
the post therapeutic. 
Coding of the blog posts and forecasts. Positive and negative affect of the patients’ blogs 
and nonpatients’ forecasts were coded with the standard LIWC dictionaries (Pennebaker, Booth, 
& Francis, 2007), which control for total word use. Despite its advantages, one limitation of 
LIWC in the present study is that it was designed to assess psychological processes rather than 
sentiment (Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). Though existing studies have successfully 
used LIWC to examine affective content (e.g., Bantum & Owen, 2009; Kahn et al., 2007; Ullrich 
& Lutgendorf, 2002) and LIWC’s estimates of affective experience have been shown to correlate 
with those of human raters (Bantum & Owen, 2009), it may be slightly less sensitive to context 
than human raters are. For example, LIWC identifies “I am not happy” and “I am happy” as 
containing equal numbers of “positive” words because both sentences reflect psychological 
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attention to the affective dimension of positivity (“happy”). Therefore, we sought a more specific 
measure of affective experience to provide convergent validity. For this purpose, we used MTurk 
coders to assess the affective content of the blogs and forecasts.  
Each of 68 MTurk participants (39 female, 29 male; mean age = 32.16 years) coded five 
randomly selected posts of patients and five randomly selected forecasts of nonpatients, as pilot 
testing indicated that MTurk coders could rate a total of 10 posts without becoming fatigued. In 
total, these participants provided ratings for 248 of the patients’ blog posts and 42 of the 
nonpatients’ forecasts. The coders were blind to condition.  
The coders were asked to imagine how each author felt when writing the blog post or 
forecast and then rated it using the items (e.g., upset, excited, scared, inspired ) from the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). On a rating scale 
from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely), the coders indicated the extent to which they 
imagined the author felt each affect listed. Responses to the positive- and negative-affect items 
were averaged separately to create a positivity index (α = .91) and a negativity index (α = .91).  
Reliability and replication. To test the reliability of the coding and the robustness of the 
results, we collected data from two additional samples. First, we recruited an MTurk sample with 
75 participants (32 male; mean age = 33.19 years). They followed the same coding procedure 
with the same subset of posts and forecasts as the original MTurk sample (positive affect: α = 
.92; negative affect: α = .91). The correlation between samples for the affective ratings of each 
post and forecast was rather low: r(246) = .38, p < .001, for positive affect and r(246) = .39, 
p < .001, for negative affect. Accordingly, we recruited a sample of research assistants to serve 
as trained coders.  
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These three coders (1 female, 2 male; mean age = 21 years) were trained to code positive 
and negative affect in the blog posts and forecasts, and they met sporadically during the training 
to clarify confusions. After the training, for consistency with the original MTurk sample, we 
asked them to code the same subset of posts and forecasts. They independently rated each of the 
290 posts and forecasts separately for positive affect (“How positive is the patient in this post?”) 
and negative affect (“How negative is the patient in this post?”), using a Likert scale from 1 (not 
at all ) to 5 (very). Interrater reliability was assessed using the KALPHA macro for SPSS (Hayes 
& Krippendorff, 2007). These lab coders showed sufficient reliability for both positive 
(Krippendorff’s α = .87) and negative (Krippendorff’s α = .86) affect. 
Procedure and Materials 
Results and Discussion 
LIWC comparisons between the patients’ blogs and nonpatients’ forecasts. Using 
LIWC, we compared the positive and negative affect of the patients and nonpatient forecasters 
by examining the percentage of positive- and negative-affect words they used (Fig. 1). The 
nonpatient forecasters (M = 2.25, SD = 1.49) used significantly more negative-affect words than 
the terminal patients did (M = 1.70%, SD = 1.27%), t(640) = −2.78, 95% CI for the mean 
difference = [−0.94%, −0.16%], p = .006, d = 0.40. There were no significant differences in 
positive affect between the terminal patients (M = 3.43%, SD = 1.84%) and the nonpatient 
forecasters (M = 3.61%, SD = 1.66%), t(640) = 0.64, 95% CI for the mean difference 
= [−0.73%, 0.37%], p = .52, d = −0.10 (see Figure 1). Analyses also revealed that for the 
terminal patients (but not the forecasters), the ratio of positive- to negative-affect words was very 
similar to the ratio in the population norms reported in the LIWC psychometric manual 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015; Tausczik & 
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Pennebaker, 2010). This suggests that the forecasters imagined the experience of dying as 
different from the experience of everyday living—an incorrect assumption but one consistent 
with research on the pitfalls of affective forecasting (Wilson et al., 2000). One potential 
limitation of this study is that the patient bloggers and nonpatient forecasters (who each wrote 
only one “post”) differed on the total amount of text written, given that the act of writing can 
improve coping with affective experiences (Pennebaker, 1997). However, among the patients, 
the total number of blog entries was positively correlated with both the percentage of positive 
affect words (r = .06, p = .003) and the percentage of negative-affect words (r = .16, p < .001), 
which suggests that increased writing did not unidirectionally increase positivity. In fact, an 
exploratory two-tailed Fischer’s r-to-z test suggested that the total number of posts was more 
strongly correlated with the percentage of negative-affect words than with the percentage of 
positive-affect words (z = 3.66, p = .0003). This test was somewhat underpowered, so these 
results should be taken with caution; however, situated within the broader pattern of results, they 
reinforce the idea that the act of writing does not exclusively increase positivity—at least, it did 
not in this sample.  
Independent coders’ ratings of the patients’ blogs and nonpatients’ forecasts. The 
original sample of MTurk coders rated the blog posts of the terminal patients significantly higher 
on positive affect (M = 2.65, SD = 0.92) than the forecasts of the nonpatients (M = 2.43, SD = 
0.97), t(675) = −3.01, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.36, −0.08], p = .003, d = 0.23 (see 
Figure 2). These coders also rated the posts of the terminal patients (M = 2.00, SD = 0.86) as 
significantly lower in negative affect than the forecasts of the nonpatients (M = 2.36, SD = 0.91), 
t(669) = 5.25, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.36, −0.08], p < .001, d = 0.41. We also 
assessed whether the coders’ ratings of positive and negative affect were influenced by their 
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demographic characteristics, such as gender or age, and found that they were not, Fs < 0.90, ps > 
.60. Consistent with the LIWC analyses, these results reveal that the experience of dying is less 
negative than people think. They also reveal that death is more positive than people believe, thus 
providing further evidence for the disconnect between imagining versus experiencing dying. 
Replication. The additional MTurk sample rated the blog posts of the patients as 
containing significantly more positive affect (M = 2.80, SD = 0.76) than the forecasts of the 
nonpatients (M = 2.47, SD = 0.57), t(224) = −2.72, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.58, 
−0.09], p = .007, d = 0.50, and also as containing significantly less negative affect (M = 1.92, SD 
= 0.63) than the forecasts of the nonpatients (M = 2.46, SD = 0.56), t(224) = 5.15, 95% CI for the 
mean difference = [0.33, 0.75], p < .001, d = 0.91. These results replicated those obtained with 
the original MTurk sample. The research assistants rated the patients’ blogs (M = 2.58, SD = 
1.04) as significantly less negative than the nonpatients’ forecasts (M = 3.44, SD = 1.33), t(246) 
= 4.03, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.44, 1.30], p < .001, d = 0.72. These coders did not 
rate the patients’ blogs (M = 3.06, SD = 1.02) as significantly differing in positivity from the 
nonpatients’ forecasts (M = 2.91, SD = 1.26), t(246) = −0.724, 95% CI for the mean difference = 
[−0.56, 0.26], p = .472, d = 0.13. Thus, these results are consistent with those obtained in the  
LIWC analyses. In summary, the results from these replication samples again indicate that dying 
from a terminal illness is less negative than merely thinking about dying and that dying from a 
terminal illness is either more positive than (MTurk coders) or as positive as (RA coders) merely 
thinking about dying.  
Longitudinal LIWC analysis of the patients’ blogs. As an exploratory investigation, we 
examined the affective character of the terminally ill patients’ blogs over time. Given the 
hierarchical, non-independent structure of these data, we used multilevel, random-slope, random-
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intercept models. Separate models were conducted for positive and negative affect (measured 
using LIWC scores), given their distinct properties (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997) and 
the nature of the data available to us.  
The models specified affect (Level 1) nested within blog (Level 2). They initially failed 
to converge because of the data distribution: There was a hard cutoff at Time 0 (blogs cannot be 
written posthumously), which exacerbated an otherwise mild positive skew of 0.55 (SE = 0.048). 
We took the natural log of time to normalize the data, and then the models converged.1  
These analyses indicated that positive affect increased significantly as the patients 
approached death, b = −0.14, SE = 0.05, 95% CI = [−0.26, −0.02], p = .026, and despite 
laypeople’s dread of death, negative affect did not increase significantly as the patients 
approached death, b = 0.008, SE = 0.04, 95% CI = [−0.07, 0.09], p = .839 (see Figs. 3 and 4 for 
the change in positive and negative affect, respectively, in the individual patients’ blogs).  
We also examined the effects of specific negative emotions over time, again using 
multilevel models with affect nested within blog. Data for the LIWC categories of general affect, 
anger, sadness, and anxiety were all submitted to separate multilevel models. All models 
included random slopes and intercepts unless otherwise noted. The base model of general affect 
suggested that the change in general affect over time was marginally significant, b = −0.14, SE = 
0.08, 95% CI = [−0.31, 0.02], p = .09; use of all affect words tended to increase over time. 
However, the use of words referring to anger, b = 0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.07], p = 
.15, and anxiety, b = −0.002, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.03, 0.02], p = .85, did not change over 
time. The use of sadness words over time showed a trend that may suggest that individuals 
                                                 
1 When we excluded blog posts less than 25 words long, this did not affect the overall pattern of results, 
so we report analyses using the full data set. 
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increase their use of sadness words as they near death, b = −0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.07, 
0.004], p = .08. Because the slope variance was quite small in the anxiety model, we report the 
results of a reduced random-intercept, fixed-slope model that more appropriately fit these data.  
Finally, because research suggests that writing can aid in coping with trauma (e.g., 
Pennebaker, 1997), we investigated whether we would still observe an increase in positive affect 
over time when we controlled for word count and total number of posts in a series of multilevel 
models. The effect of word count on positive affect was nonsignificant, b = −0.00007, SE = 
0.0001, 95% CI = [−0.0003, 0.0002], p = .52, and the increase in positive affect remained 
significant over time when we controlled for word count, b = −0.14, SE = 0.05, 95% CI = [−0.26, 
−0.02], p = .026, which suggests that the uptick in positive affect as death neared was not simply 
due to increased writing over time. Moreover, the number of words per blog entry did not change 
over time, b = −18.34, SE = 23.02, 95% CI = [−66.48, 29.80], p = .44, which suggests that the 
increased positivity found as the patients neared death cannot be accounted for solely by 
increased volume of writing in each post.  
The effect of the total number of blog posts on positive affect was also nonsignificant, b 
= −0.0008, SE = 0.0008, 95% CI = [−0.002, 0.0009], p = .372, and positive affect still increased 
significantly over time when we controlled for the total number of posts per blog, b = −0.13, SE 
= 0.05, 95% CI = [−0.25, −0.01], p = .03. Taken together, these analyses suggest that neither 
writing longer posts nor writing a greater number of posts can fully account for the increase in 
positive affect over time that we observed.  
These longitudinal results complement the forecasting results reported earlier, as they 
reveal that terminal patients become more positive as they approach death. This results from 
increased focus on meaning-making frameworks, such as religion and relationships with close 
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friends and family, during one’s final days . Of course, there are limitations to this study: The 
terminal patients were still some distance from death when they started blogging (M = 68.24 
weeks, SD = 46.08), the total number of blogs in our sample was not large, and the blog writers 
were a self-selected sample. Study 2 addressed these limitations by using a large sample of one-
time reports obtained immediately before death: the final words of death-row inmates. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: LAST WORDS OF DEATH ROW INMATES 
This study examined the affect of death-row prisoners immediately before execution, 
contrasting their last words with the imagined last words of forecasters and with poetry written 
by death-row inmates, who constitute a matched sample further from death. We again used both 
LIWC and independent coders to assess emotional content. Given the results of Study 1, we 
predicted that inmates’ last words would be more positive and less negative than affective 
forecasts or poetry written by death-row inmates. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Death-row inmates’ last words. Inmates’ last words were gathered from the Texas 
Department of Justice, which lists all executed prisoners’ last words from 1982 to the present. 
Our analyses included all last words from December 7, 1982, to June 26, 2013 (N = 500 
inmates). However, 104 inmates either were reported to have given no last statement or simply 
had a recorded last statement of “no” or some variant thereof. Thus, the final sample consisted of 
the last words of 396 inmates.  
Of the executed prisoners, 225 were White or Caucasian, 187 were Black, 86 were 
Hispanic, and 2 were identified as “other.” Four hundred ninety-five were male, and 5 were 
female. The mean age was 38.76 years. The final statements had a mean number of 110.15 words 
(range: 1–1,269). 
Death-row inmates’ poetry. To create a well-matched sample for comparison with death-
row last words, we gathered a sample of poetry (N = 188 poems) written by death-row inmates. 
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We searched the University of North Carolina’s library system and gathered all books with 
death-row poetry—five in total. In addition, we included in our sample all of the poems from the 
Web site that compiled death-row poetry at the time we conducted this study, humanwrites.org. 
Each poem was entered into a text file to make it compatible with LIWC.  
Noninmates’ forecasts. One-hundred fifty participants were recruited from MTurk. Of 
this group, 117 successfully followed directions and passed attention checks (53 female, 64 
male; mean age = 33.89 years). The forecasters imagined that they had been found guilty of a 
crime that is punishable by death, were on death row, and would be executed the next day. They 
were instructed as follows: “Take a moment to place yourself in this situation. Try to imagine 
what you would think about the day before your execution. Try to feel the emotions you would 
feel when facing execution.” They were then asked to write their last statement. Participants 
wrote a mean of 41.61 words (range: 1–169). 
Independent coding of the last words, forecasts, and poetry. We analyzed the affective 
content of the inmates’ last words, the noninmates’ forecasts, and the inmates’ poetry using 
LIWC. To complement this analysis, as in Study 1, we asked a sample of MTurk participants to 
code the positive and negative affect of these texts using the PANAS. Forty condition-blind 
MTurk participants (20 female, 20 male; mean age = 34.02) each rated 10 randomly selected 
texts (5 last words, 5 forecasts). In total, this gave us 200 ratings of last words and 200 ratings of 
noninmates’ forecasts. As in Study 1, indices for positive affect (α = .91) and negative affect (α = 
.81) were created.  
A separate group of 45 MTurk participants (22 female, 23 male; mean age = 33.00 years) 
rated 10 randomly selected death-row inmates’ poems using the PANAS; a total of 169 of the 
possible 188 poems were coded. These participants rated only true death-row poetry, as there 
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was no forecasted poetry. The poems were randomly selected. Positive- and negative-affect 
ratings were again averaged separately to create a positivity index (α = .87) and a negativity 
index (α = .86).  
Reliability and replication. To test the reliability of the coding and the robustness of the 
results, we collected data from two additional samples, as in Study 1, focusing on the comparison 
between inmates’ last words and noninmates’ forecasts.  
An MTurk sample of 40 participants (18 female, 22 male; mean age = 36.05 years) 
followed the same coding procedure for positive affect (α = .88) and negative affect (α = .86) as 
the original MTurk sample, using with the same subset of inmates’ last words and noninmates’ 
forecasts. The correlation between samples for the affective ratings of each text was rather low: 
r(246) = .38, p < .001, for positive affect and r(246) = .39, p < .001, for negative affect. 
Accordingly, we asked the trained research assistants from Study 1 to rate the same subset of 
texts on positive affect (“How positive is the inmate in this last statement?”) and negative affect 
(“How negative is the inmate in this last statement?”), using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very; 
α = .95 for positive affect and α = .96 for negative affect). Interrater reliability was calculated 
using the KALPHA macro for SPSS (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) and was reasonable for both 
positive (Krippendorff’s α = .76) and negative (Krippendorff’s α = .79) affect. 
 
 We recruited 54 participants via MTurk (46.3% female, Mage = 37 years), who completed 
a two-condition (Patient: Absent, Present) within-subjects experiment. No participants’ data were 
excluded from the study.  
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Results and Discussion 
LIWC comparisons of inmates’ last words, inmates’ poetry, and noninmates’ forecasts. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that last words, forecast last words, and 
death-row poetry differed significantly in both negative affect, F(2, 695) = 28.10, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.075, and positive affect, F(2, 695) = 4.54, p = .011, ηp2 = .013 (see Figure 5 for means). The 
death-row inmates’ last words (M = 2.61%, SD = 2.76%, 95% CI = [2.02%, 3.20%]) used a 
significantly lower percentage of negative-affect words than did the inmates’ poetry (M = 5.12%, 
SD = 6.11%, 95% CI = [4.26%, 5.98%]), and both the last words and the poetry contained less 
negative affect than the noninmates’ forecasts (M = 7.00%, SD = 11.57%, 95% CI = [5.90%, 
8.11%]). In addition, the percentage of positive affect words was higher in the last words (M = 
9.23%, SD = 7.49%, 95% CI = [8.14%, 10.32%]) and death-row poetry (M = 10.25%, SD = 
17.55%, 95% CI = [8.67%, 11.83%]) than in the forecast last words (M = 6.37%, SD = 6.62%, 
95% CI = [5.14%, 7.60%]). The inmates’ last words and poetry did not differ significantly from 
each other in positive affect.2 
Consistent with the results of Study 1, these results reveal that forecasters overestimate 
the negativity and underestimate the positivity of dying. Death-row inmates’ last words are less 
negative but not more positive than their poetry, which suggests that forecasters (death-row 
poets) also overestimate the negativity of life under an eventual death sentence. Of course, death-
row poetry is not a perfect control for last words, as this poetry is not always specifically about 
dying, and poetic death-row inmates may be generally more negative and less positive than 
death-row inmates who do not write poetry. However, prior research suggests that experience 
                                                 
2 We note that 10 inmates’ last words were at least partially written. Results were the same as those 
reported here when we excluded these 10 statements. 
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with poetry is linked to less use of negative words rather than more (Kao & Jurafsky, 2012). 
Future research could more fully investigate differences in affect between (a) poetry and other 
types of writing, (b) different types of poetry, and (c) different types of poets (e.g., amateurs vs. 
professionals). 
Exploratory analyses revealed that, compared with noninmates’ forecasts, death-row last 
words had higher rates of words in the LIWC categories of religion and social connection ( ps < 
.05), factors previously  shown to be associated with stress and well-being (Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Mochon, Norton, & Ariely, 2011). Exploratory bootstrapped mediation analyses using the 
SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012, 2013) further revealed that the increased use of religion 
and social-connection words in the last words partially mediated the differences in positive affect 
between the last words and forecasts, bs > −0.09, ps < .05. Religion also partially mediated group 
differences in negative affect. These analyses suggest that religion and other meaning-making 
processes and ideologies may help allay death anxiety for individuals for whom death is salient 
(for a full review of religion’s effects on death anxiety, see Jong & Halberstadt, 2016). 
Independent coders’ ratings of inmates’ last words, inmates’ poetry, and noninmates’ 
forecasts.3 A one-way ANOVA on the independent coders’ ratings revealed that last words, 
forecast last words, and death row poetry differed significantly in both negative affect, F(2, 847) 
= 11.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .027, and positive affect, F(2, 847) = 10.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .023 (see 
Figure 6 for means). The inmates’ last words were rated as less negative (M = 1.96, SD = 0.83, 
95% CI = [1.84, 2.06]) than the death-row poetry (M = 2.19, SD = 0.80, 95% CI = [2.12, 2.27]), 
                                                 
3 We wondered whether individuals would be able to tell the difference between death-row last 
statements and noninmates’ forecasts, so we had 151 MTurk workers (72 female) read 30 last statements 
(15 by inmates, 15 by noninmate forecasters) and rate whether they thought a death-row prisoner or an 
MTurk worker had written each one. A multilevel model revealed that participants could not distinguish 
between the groups, b = 0.003, SE = 0.06, p = .95. 
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and the noninmates’ forecasts were rated as the most negative (M = 2.33, SD = 0.81, 95% CI = 
[2.23, 2.46]). Also, the last words (M = 2.24, SD = 0.77, 95% CI = [2.12, 2.35]) and death-row 
poetry (M = 2.39, SD = 0.86, 95% CI = [2.32, 2.47]) were rated as more positive than the 
forecast last words (M = 2.08, SD = 0.78, 95% CI = [1.98, 2.21]). Inmates’ last words and 
inmates’ poetry did not differ significantly from each other in ratings of positive affect.4  
Replication. The additional sample of MTurk coders rated inmates’ last words (M = 2.45, 
SD = 0.88) as containing significantly more positive affect than noninmates’ forecasts (M = 2.24, 
SD = 0.74), t(291) = 2.18, p = .029, d = 0.26. Furthermore, these coders rated the inmates’ last 
words (M = 2.23, SD = 0.88) as significantly less negative than the noninmates’ forecasts (M = 
2.51, SD = 0.68), t(291) = −3.04, p = .003, d = 0.36. The trained coders rated the inmates’ last 
words (M = 2.82, SD = 0.89) as significantly more positive than the noninmates’ forecasts (M = 
2.15, SD = 0.74), t(309) = 7.03, p < .001, d = 0.82. However, they rated the inmates’ last words 
(M = 2.52, SD = 1.23) and the noninmates’ forecasts (M = 2.58, SD = 0.94) as not significantly 
different in negative affect, t(309) = −0.51, p = .61, d = 0.05.  
Results in context. These results further suggest that death is more positive than people 
believe, and less negative than suggested by the affective content of death row poetry. However, 
it is important to note that the noninmate forecasters differed in many ways from the death-row 
inmates. Although the inmates and noninmate forecasters were in the same age range, the mid to 
upper 30s on average (inmates: M = 38.75 years; noninmates: M = 33.89 years), other potential 
differences between the two samples include differences in education, race, and religion; for this 
reason, we also analyzed poetry written by death-row prisoners, who more closely match the 
                                                 
4 As a robustness check, we examined whether the results remained similar when we excluded all 
statements with fewer than 25 words—as these short statements may skew results. This exclusion did not 
affect the pattern of results, so we report results of analyses using the full data set. 
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demographics of the last-words sample. Of course, this control also had limitations, and we 
acknowledge that future research would benefit from more closely matched comparison groups 
(e.g., prisoners sentenced to life without parole).  
Also, although poetry was limited as a sample of writing for our purposes because it need 
not directly concern death (although many poems do), it allowed us to assess change in positivity 
and negativity over time, as in the exploratory longitudinal analyses of Study 1. Unlike Study 1, 
which revealed an increase in positivity but no change in negativity as death neared, this study 
revealed no change in positivity but a decrease in negativity. Taken together, however, these 
longitudinal results suggest that death never becomes worse as one approaches it, and either 
becomes more pleasant or less unpleasant. Most important, the key finding of this study—and 
that of Study 1—is that forecasters overestimate the negativity and underestimate the positivity 
of dying. 
  
 
 21 
 
 
INTERNAL META-ANALYSIS 
Given that the observed effects varied in magnitude across our studies and coding 
methods, we performed an internal meta-analysis using all effect sizes (Cohen’s ds) from 
comparisons of individuals facing imminent death and those only imagining imminent death 
(Table 1). Averaging across coding methods and studies revealed clear evidence for our 
hypotheses. Relative to individuals who are imagining death, those who are about to die are more 
positive (d = 0.31) and less negative (d = 0.48). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 Death is inevitable, but dread is not. These two studies reveal that the experience 
of dying is unexpectedly positive. Not only do the blog posts of terminally ill patients tend to 
become more positive as death approaches, but they also tend to be less negative and more 
positive than the forecasts of nonpatients (Study 1). The last words of death-row inmates are also 
more positive and less negative than the forecasts of noninmates (Study 2)—in part because of a 
differential focus on social connection and religion. Although results varied somewhat across 
different coding methods, one fact is clear from our internal meta-analysis: In every comparison, 
dying was either more positive or less negative—or both—than people imagined it to be.  
These findings are consistent with previous research calling into question the assumed 
link between death and feelings of dismay (DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Kashdan et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, open questions remain. Although we used two distinct samples of people facing 
death, our results may not generalize to all people as they near death, such as those who die from 
old age. However, as people tend to focus more on the positive as they age, the effects we 
observed could be even stronger in the elderly (Reed & Carstensen, 2012). Our experiments 
included multiple controls—forecasts from laypeople, within-participants longitudinal analyses, 
independent coders, and matched poetry samples—but inclusion of additional comparison 
groups would be informative and would strengthen future research on this topic. Furthermore, 
although personally dying may be better than expected, standing by while a loved one dies may 
take a different affective course.  
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Given the growing aging population, this work has potential to inform the contentious 
political debate surrounding palliative care (Hughes-Hallett, Craft, Davies, Mackay, & Nielsson, 
2011). Currently, the medical system is geared toward avoiding death—an avoidance that is 
often motivated by views of death as terrible and tragic (Gawande, 2014). This focus is 
understandable given cultural narratives of death’s negativity, but our results suggest that death 
is more positive than people expect: Meeting the grim reaper may not be as grim it seems. 
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Table 1. Meta-Analysis of the Effect Sizes Across Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Study and measure LIWC 
analysis 
MTurk 
coders 
MTurk coders 
(replication) 
Research-
assistant 
coders 
Overall d 
Terminal illness (Study 1)      
 
 Positive affect 
–0.10 0.23 0.50 0.13 0.19 
 Negative affect 0.40 0.41 0.91 0.72 0.61 
Death row (Study 2)      
 
 Positive affect 
0.40 0.21 0.26 0.82 0.42 
 Negative affect 0.52 0.45 0.36 0.05 0.35 
Combined studies      
 
 Positive affect 
0.15 0.22 0.38 0.48 0.31 
 Negative affect 0.46 0.43 0.64 0.39 0.48 
 
Note: LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007); 
MTurk = Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
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Figure 1. Language Use in Terminally Ill Patients or Forecasters.  
Percentages of positive- and negative-affect words used by the terminally ill patients and the 
nonpatient forecasters as coded by LIWC. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
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Figure 2. Coder Ratings of Terminally Ill Patient and Forecaster Language 
 The original coders’ mean ratings of the terminally ill patients’ and nonpatients’ negative and 
positive affect. Error bars indicate ±1 SE. 
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Figure 3. Positive Affect Words in Patients’ Blogs Over Time. 
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Figure 4. Negative Affect Words in Patients’ Blogs Over Time. 
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Figure 5.  Positive and Negative Affect Words by Death Row Sample  
Percentage of positive and negative affect words used in inmates’ last words, inmates’ poetry, 
and noninmates’ forecasts as coded by Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count. Error bars indicate 
±1 SE. 
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Figure 6.  Coder Ratings of Death Row Samples’ Language  
Results from Study 2: positive and negative affect of the inmates’ last words, inmates’ poetry, 
and noninmates’ forecasts, as coded by the original group of independent raters. Error bars 
indicate ±1 SE. 
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